Cohesion, COVID-19 and contemporary challenges to globalization by DELIOS, Andrew et al.
Singapore Management University 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of 
Business Lee Kong Chian School of Business 
4-2021 
Cohesion, COVID-19 and contemporary challenges to 
globalization 
Andrew DELIOS 
National University of Singapore 
Gordon PERCHTHOLD 
Singapore Management University, gordonrp@smu.edu.sg 
Alex CAPRI 
National University of Singapore 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research 
 Part of the Public Health Commons, and the Strategic Management Policy Commons 
Citation 
DELIOS, Andrew; PERCHTHOLD, Gordon; and CAPRI, Alex. Cohesion, COVID-19 and contemporary 
challenges to globalization. (2021). Journal of World Business. 56, (3),. Research Collection Lee Kong 
Chian School Of Business. 
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/6661 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at 
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research 
Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at 
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email cherylds@smu.edu.sg. 
1 
 
Cohesion, COVID-19 and contemporary challenges to globalization 
Andrew Delios 
Department of Strategy and Policy, NUS Business School, National University of Singapore, 117592, Singapore 
Gordon Perchthold 
Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, 188065, Singapore 
Alex Capri 
Department of Analytics and Operations, NUS Business School, 117592, Singapore 
 




In the years preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, the decades-long, pan-continental globalization 
consensus was being questioned. In our view, the pandemic has accelerated the rate at which the 
globalization consensus is being defied. To better understand the implications of this defiance, we 
turn to research on people, organizations and international competition to see whether this defiance 
weakens the cohesion needed to keep globalization moving apace. People and organizations create 
cohesive forces that can link and constrain the differences that are encountered when people and 
organizations move across international borders. Meanwhile, the nature of international competition, 
particularly as connected to the level of active involvement by state actors, can lead to fractures that 
reduce cohesion across polities and societies. 
 
Keywords 
Social pressures, Identity, Strategy, Organizational structure, Techno-nationalism, Immigration 
 
1. Introduction 
There is no question that the COVID-19 pandemic has created a unique set of pressures for the 
conduct of international business and the pursuit of globalization. The question is not whether there 
will be an impact; instead, it is a matter of asking how much the pandemic has accelerated the changes 
that had already been in motion in recent years. Our perspective is that we need to understand the 
underlay of people, organizations and international competition to understand if the pandemic will 
lead to greater fractures across various elements of societies, or whether people, organizations and 
competition can strengthen the cohesive forces that are critical to cementing gaps and close the 
distances that are exposed during the process of globalization. 
We focus on intertwining three topics – people, organizations, and competition – to the pandemic to 
understand better what consequences this accelerant has for international business and the advance of 
globalization. Our central theme to tie the three is the concept of cohesion. Cohesion is an important 
concept because it is fundamental to the globalization process. Globalization brings together people, 
organizations and nation states that vary in values, behaviours and beliefs. It is critical to build bridges 
across these differences to not let them repel the pace of globalization. To the extent that people and 
2 
 
organizations can serve as agents of cohesion, and to the extent that nation states can agree on broad 
guidelines on international competition, there is a greater chance to prevent the fractures that can 
drive back the globalization process. 
Our starting point for this perspective is that the globalization consensus has indeed been under 
pressure in recent years. This starting point has its roots in three common refrains in contemporary 
writings on globalization: (1) deglobalization, (2) heightened regionalization, and (3) value chain 
reconfiguration. As connected to these points, there has been much discussion of how trade tensions, 
supply chain disruptions, and nationalism have led to political positions that defy the globalization 
consensus (Devinney & Hartwell, 2020; Enderwick & Buckley, 2020), and challenge a nation’s 
political institutions (Hitt, Holmes, & Arregle, 2020). 
Rather than continuing to traverse these well-trodden paths, we wander in a different direction to 
discuss how people, organizations, and new perspectives on international competition influence 
overarching political, societal and competitive pressures that in turn can lead to dysfunctionalities in 
the globalization process (Witt, 2019). These pressures clearly have consequences for whether we will 
see bridges built across the differences that well up when diversity in people, organizations and 
political-economies collide. Our contention is that under certain circumstances, people and 
organizations can be important forces of cohesion, even in a world where interstate rivalries 
complicate the nature of internationalization and global competition. 
We develop our ideas on cohesion in the time of the pandemic by looking at three ways in which 
research can be developed. First, we look at cohesion across people through a focused literature 
review on globalization and people. Second, we look at cohesion in multinational corporations 
(MNCs) by highlighting how specific research approaches can inform our understandings of which 
MNCs will be resilient in times of international uncertainty. Third, we look at the emergent era in 
international competition through a rich depiction of the phenomenon of techno-nationalism. By 
highlighting three modalities – literature, method and phenomenon – of inspiring research, we seek to 
not only raise perceptions on promising research questions, but also rouse curiosities on how such 
consequent investigations could be motivated and structured. 
 
2. People 
The globalization process involves a growing connectedness and interdependence of economies, 
organizations, people, and societies. Cross-border flows of goods and services, capital, technology, 
people, and information yield a more globalized world (Ghemawat, 2003). 
Within the current debate about globalization, especially as connected to the pandemic, the fractures 
that have emerged in politics and economics have received a substantial emphasis. This emphasis is 
not surprising given the rhetoric and realities that are being played out amongst national leaders and 
business leaders (The Economist, 2019). Yet, within this milieu, we should not overlook the important 
role that people play in providing cohesion across diverse societies that increasingly meet as a 
consequence of the globalization process. 
Flows of people across borders can occur in any number of ways – by moving as economic migrants 
from one economy to another, by working as expatriate labor, by the process of family reunification, 
or by studying at an institution in a country other than their home country. The relocation of people 
across borders and the corresponding disruptions and adjustments immigrants must make in their lives 
has had no shortage of research. 
Countries that receive immigrants often proudly evoke an image of multiculturalism. But the path to 
multiculturalism is far from smooth from a societal perspective and an individual perspective. 
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Immigrants can often be seen as posing threats to incumbent populations (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & 
Armstrong, 2001). When seen as threats, clashes in value systems emerge as cultures and values 
across groups seek dominance. 
An immigrant’s exposure to a new environment yields pressures to acculturate to the new 
environment. Acculturating individuals need to manage their motivations and abilities to maintain 
their own culture while also maintaining their motivations and abilities to connect to the host country 
culture (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Chen, Benet-Martínez, & Bond, 2008). Where there is 
balance in this process, we have a bicultural individual. This process of bi-culturation is vital as 
negative attitudes towards immigrants increase when there is an awareness of a clash of cultural 
homogeneities instead of the growth of respect for cultural heterogeneity. Negative attitudes can be 
demonstrated as aggressively adverse sentiments and actions during times of economic or political 
stress (Sides & Citrin, 2007), such as what has been occurring during the pandemic. 
Since the onset of the pandemic, the popular press has no shortage of reports of ill-motivated 
aggressions against seemingly Asian people in the United States (Kambhampaty, 2020), Australia 
(Zhou, 2020), and Europe (The Economist, 2020), or in Asia with respect to minority groups in their 
societies. In this sense, the pandemic amplifies a common prejudice to immigrants in terms of 
aggressions by the in-groups against out-groups of newly arrived people to a country (Stephan, 
Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). Social aggregates and ethnocentrism work hand-in-hand to influence the 
degree of prejudice faced by immigrants (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). 
Increased aggression and a lesser acceptance of specific ethnicities of immigrants have been an 
unfortunate consequence of the pandemic, but beyond this initial outcome, there are reverberations for 
international business. This second layer of effects connects to international business through the 
concept of identity and then through the critical role that immigrants play in providing cohesion to 
business communities spread across cultures. 
Immigrants are faced with the prospects of adapting to their new country while also maintaining a 
connection and sense of attachment to the country from which they emigrated. This tension leads to 
the aforementioned issues with identity and attachment. With the emergence of the pandemic, there 
are fewer reasons for an immigrant to attach to the country where they face visible animosity. The 
social cohesion and linkages that support globalization from an individual level weaken, which 
aggravates already weakened political ties and communications between nations. 
The consequence is not only a decreased force of globalization, but typical immigrant-related benefits 
to international business are further endangered. It is well-known that immigrants link business 
communities, such as how diasporas help bridge institutional divides (Riddle, Hrivnak, & Nielsen, 
2010) or how diasporas foster FDI flows back to the countries from which they emigrated (Gillespie, 
Riddle, Sayre, & Sturges, 1999). 
Yet, the cohesion-related gains from immigrants and diasporas are not uniform, there will be 
variances, and some diasporas will draw investment more effectively than other diasporas (Li, 
Hernandez, & Gwon, 2019). Immigrant communities can hence be important bridges between home 
and host nations (Rangan & Sengul, 2009), but if there is a weakening of this association, then the 
effectiveness of the FDI process can be placed at risk. This risk emerges because of the crucial role 
that immigrants can play in linking cross-national communities, given how their common country 
bonds provide unique knowledge flows that facilitate the conduct of international business 
(Hernandez, 2014). 
Even with this clear evidence on the critical role that immigrants and diasporas have for the conduct 
of international business and the process of globalization (Lin, Zheng, Lu, Liu, & Wright, 2019), it is 
easy to overlook how the pandemic and increased aggression and decreased acceptance of immigrant 
groups, particularly in the context of protecting jobs and businesses of local nationals, can have 
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profound consequences. Aggression can reduce identification with the country of immigration. With 
this reduction, the potential for the social tightening and mutual understanding that emerges with 
millions of people studying, working, and establishing new lives living overseas, will be reduced. The 
underlying cohesive social structures that are necessary to support long-term business connections 
across countries will be weakened (Crane & Hartwell, 2019). How international business and the 
international business community respond to these changes in people will be a non-trivial question to 
be addressed by our scholarly community (Cuervo‐Cazurra, Doz, & Gaur, 2020; Zahra, 2020). 
 
3. Organizations 
Organizations can be a form of cohesion that can quell ruptures in the globalization landscape. 
Alternatively, when organizations divorce themselves from international markets, they can be wedges 
that help widen these ruptures. Whether an organization acts as a cohesive force or as a wedge 
depends in part on how it has historically embraced internationalization, as represented in its 
structures, systems, processes, and people. 
We illustrate these ideas by drawing on the research reported in Perchthold (2016). We highlight this 
research as it provides an example of how qualitative research creates new opportunities for theory 
generation (Welch, Piekkari, Plakoyiannaki, & Paavilainen-Mantymaki, 2011). Perchthold (2016) 
used a qualitative approach in which 86 senior leaders of numerous financial services institutions 
were interviewed to explore questions related to company-specific histories of internationalization. 
The interviews were complemented and supplemented by reference to information in company 
reports, industry reports, and media. 
Perchthold (2016) found that only 3 of the 12 financial services institutions (FSIs) profiled in the 
research had a sustained commitment to internationalization throughout their history. The other 9 FSIs 
had periods of increasing commitment to international markets and periods of decreasing commitment 
to international markets, which Perchthold (2016) identified as vacillating commitment. 
This research is relevant to a world facing a pandemic because the pandemic has arisen at a time 
where globalization was already being questioned, and very real questions exist as to whether MNCs 
can withstand pressures to reduce international market exposure. The pandemic clearly places an 
additional strain on the globalization thesis. Yet, will all organizations react similarly to retract from 
global markets to re-shore activities or shift activities to other international locales? Moreover, will 
we be able to identify the characteristics of organizations that can be linked systematically to the types 
of responses we will see to the emerging environmental imperatives that demarcate new boundaries in 
the globalization arena? 
We turn to the research of Perchthold (2016) because it provides illustrations of both research ideas 
and methods as related to these two questions. Perchthold (2016) is situated in the rich literature on 
the importance of strategy and structure for multinational firms (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Ghoshal & 
Bartlett, 1990; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). 
Building from this research tradition, Perchthold (2016) identified three strategy and structural 
approaches to internationalization in the 12 FSIs studied. Across these three types of FSIs – 
foundational, strategic, and opportunistic – were the aforementioned different levels of commitment 






Table 1. Levels of Commitment by FSI MNCs by Internationalization Events in Asia. 
FSI MNC Engaged commitment Passive commitment Partial de-
commitment 
Full de-commitment 
Citigroup 1915 Acquisition of IBC Commitment Remained Consistent Since Foundation 
HSBC 1865 Founded operations in 
multiple host markets in 
Asia and London 
Commitment Remained Consistent Since Foundation 
AIG/AIA 1919 Founded operations in 
multiple host markets in 
Asia and New York 
Commitment Remained Consistent Since Foundation 
Prudential 
plc. 
1994 Strategic mandate to 
build in Asia. Chief of Staff 
to Group CEO appointed 
Asia CEO and made 
member of corporate board 
In the Second Wave of Internationalization Prudential’s Commitment to 




1995 Hong Kong 
handover to China caused 
immaterial investment to 
build financial conduit 
between HK/China and 
Canada/US 
  
ANZ Bank 1984 acquisition of 
Grindlays Bank (an 
organization half the size of 
ANZ Bank) 
1984- Grindlays absorbed 
with difficulty in 
integrating acquisition 
1993 divest Africa 
operations 
2000 divests UK, 
Europe, Middle east, 




establishment of operations 
in Asia and Europe 
1989 half century after 
previous de-commitment, 
begins cautious 
investment in Hong Kong 
2006 has operations 
across Asia, but 
declines award of 
license to enter 
Vietnam 
2010 to 2013 divested 
all 7 insurance host 





operations in Hong Kong 
and Indonesia 
 
1996 divests operations 
in Hong Kong and 
Indonesia 
Sun Life 1891 establishes 68 
insurance operations 
throughout Asia and 
worldwide 
1986 After years of 
divesting all but two 
foreign market operations, 
Group CEO initiates entry 
into Indonesia. 
1997 Successor Group 
CEO constrains 
financial resources 
invested in China, India 
and elsewhere in Asia 
1930s to 1969 divested 
all but a couple of its 
previous 68 host markets 
Metlife 2005−2010 increasing 
investment culminating in 
acquisition of AIG’s ALICO 
Asia/Global operations 
(Japan largest business 
outside the US) 
1987/88 immaterial 
investments made in four 
countries in Asia 
1989−1995 Asia de-
emphasized in favor of 
home market. Asia 







1983 Colonial establishes 
insurance operations in 7 
host markets in Asia 
2005 CBA quietly begins 
establishing bank joint 
ventures in China, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, India 
 
2000 CBA acquires 
Colonial and divests 
from 5 host markets in 
Asia (retains small 
presence in China, 
Indonesia) 
Manulife 2008 post-GFC after Hong 
Kong financed corporate 
cash needs, Manulife 
changes Board, Regional 
CEO with emphasis on Asia 
1985 relocated mid-level 




1945 failed to rebuild 
operations across Asia 
although Hong Kong 
and Philippines left to 
operate on their own 
 
 
To provide detail on what these commitment categories mean in terms of internationalization events, 
we created Table 1. In this Table, we list in the first column each of the 12 FSI MNCs. We note that 
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for the first four MNCs in the Table – Citigroup, HSBC, AIG/AIA, and eventually Prudential plc 
(after an initial period of vacillating commitment) – they maintained a continuous commitment to 
internationalization. However, the other eight FSI MNCs vacillated in their level of commitment to 
internationalization. That is, they had periods in which their internationalization had an engaged 
commitment or a passive commitment, alternating with periods in which commitments were reduced 
in partial or full. 
The examples presented in Table 1 are summarized in Fig. 1 as historical events in the international 
pathways of the 12 FSI MNCs. As mentioned earlier, the pathways included the direction and the 
extent of internationalization in terms of commitment and de-commitment and the comparative 
intensity of the two general directions. 
Turning back to the three pathways, the first pathway is populated by Foundational MNCs. These 
three MNCs are AIG, Citibank, and HSBC. Foundational MNCs established operations across 
multiple countries shortly after being incorporated. In these cases, the expansions were made 
throughout Asia, as well as in global financial centers. These MNCs developed a multi-country 
conceptualization of how to conduct business. The structures and processes found in their 
organization influenced the amount, duration, and type of investment in the management and financial 
resources they applied to their internationalized administrative structure. Ultimately, through this 
application of resources, they could stay at a continuous level of engaged commitment to 
internationalization throughout their history of international operations. It is important to note that 
foundational MNCs have the structures that are most likely to provide cohesion during times of 
pressure to the globalization thesis. 
 






The second pathway, Strategic MNCs, is represented by one case in the sample, namely Prudential 
plc. This company began its internationalization process with engaged commitment, yet it 
subsequently fully withdrew from international markets for multiple decades. Later, from the 1990s 
onwards, it was strategically-driven by an increasingly less hospitable home regulatory environment 
to internationalize. 
The third pathway, which we called Opportunistic MNCs, was represented by eight companies. 
Opportunistic MNCs were incorporated and operated within their home market for many decades, 
prior to undertaking their initial internationalization steps into Asia. These companies often had 
periods of engaged or passive commitment to international markets. However, their pathways were 
also marked by notable internationalization events that reduced their level of commitment to 
international markets either via a partial de-commitment or by a full de-commitment. Notably, within 
their organization, the MNCs perpetuated an ethnocentric conceptualization (Perlmutter, 1969) of how 
to conduct international business. Opportunistic MNCs are the organizations most at risk to reduce 
international exposure during unusual times such as the pandemic. 
The important point that connects to research on multinational firms’ responses in terms of creating 
cohesion across globally dispersed activities is that these three archetypes have within-group 
similarities in their organizational structures, and systems. As an example, opportunistic MNCs are 
represented well by ANZ Bank. 
ANZ Bank leapt into internationalization in the 1980s with its acquisition of Grindlays Bank. 
Subsequently, in the mid-1990s, it divested its Grindlays Bank’s operations in Africa while not 
deepening its investment in operations in East Asia. Next, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it 
divested Grindlays Bank’s European, Middle-Eastern, and South Asian operations. After a brief 
recommitment to a supra-regional strategy in South and East Asia, the company once again divested 
its international operations, except for its institutional banking business in East Asia. 
Notably, when we dive into the administrative structures of ANZ, we see an MNC that seems to lack 
diversity. For example, when we look at the company’s CEOs, we see an apparent homogeneity in the 
five CEOs who led the bank from 1980 until 2020. All were male, with an Anglo-Saxon heritage. 
Diversity at the CEO level by these two demographic measures was lacking (Table 2). 
 





Moreover, when we turn to the bank's organizational systems and structures, as depicted in Fig. 2, we 
find that the bank has institutionalized an administrative structure in which the International Division 
sat separate from other divisions. Those involved in decisions on international functions were often 
excluded from broader decision making processes in HQ. The organization was bifurcated below the 
Office of the CEO between historical home country nationals and those having international 
experience comprising mixed-nationalities. Leadership development was not inclusive, which led to a 
predominantly ethnocentric orientation in headquarters. Further, the company had a strong corporate 
hierarchy and an explicit formalization for communications and decision-making. 
 
Fig. 2. Strategy, Structures and Processes in Financial Services MNCs. 
 
 
If we compare administrative structures more generally across foundational, strategic, and 
opportunistic FSI MNCs, we can clearly see the differences. The foundational MNCs – Citibank, 
HSBC, and AIG/AIA – had a matrix organization. They engaged in training processes that inculcated 
a mindset and culture of ‘international’ throughout the company. Their approach to leadership 
development was geocentric and inclusive. Their business practices reflected dense modes of 
communication across multiple nodes, resembling a networked organization. 
At the other end were opportunistic MNCs, which tended to vacillate in their level of commitment to 
internationalization. These organizations isolated the internationalization function and did not engage 
in specific leadership development initiatives that fostered skills suited to multiple markets or a 
culture of international inclusiveness. These organizations remained rooted in a home country ethos in 
a veritable archetype of an ethnocentric organization. The level of hierarchy and formalization in 
business practices helped perpetuate the organization's home country biases and culture. 
The contrast in structures, organizational cultures, and systems created divergences in outcomes when 
an MNC was faced with questions and oppositions from external stakeholders, such as shareholders, 
analysts, regulators, and media, about their international markets. The leaders of the MNCs must 
manage external stakeholders regarding their commitment levels to internationalization. When faced 
with the uncertainties from international markets that could come from disquieting news and 
performance shortfalls, corporate boards of the MNCs with an opportunistic orientation were more 
likely to move to appease stakeholders by de-committing from foreign markets (Pedersen, Soda, & 
Stea, 2019). With a robust global structure and a cultivated team of diverse and internationally-
oriented managers, Foundational MNCs were more able to be a cohesive force as they withstood calls 
from boundedly-rational stakeholders to withdraw from foreign markets. 
The situations and challenges highlighted herein are magnified during the pandemic. Domestic 
markets are uncertain. Foreign markets are even more uncertain, with returns from international 
operations more variable than in non-pandemic periods. These trends coalesce actors in domestic 
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markets to emphasize nationalistic concerns. Without question, it is as propitious a time as any to 
understand how organizational structures and systems, how relationships between subsidiaries and 
parent firms, and how even the most elementary conceptions of how an MNC approaches its 
international markets along ethnocentric, polycentric, and geocentric dimensions flavor its responses 
to the pandemic (Perlmutter, 1969). 
The responsibility of the IB scholarly community in this area should be to develop data that speak 
clearly and unambiguously to the question of how and why multinational firms respond differently 
during the pandemic to external forces, to either provide cohesion or to be a wedge. Forces such as 
rising nationalism, legitimized populism, and changes in perspectives on the value of efficiency 
versus resilience are creating the potential for a more atomized world (Rodrik, 2018). There will be 
scales of responses across MNCs, which is incumbent in our scholarly community to address, 
especially given a chance for even greater changes post-pandemic in how organizations and nations 
compete in a neoteric era of globalization. 
 
4. Competition 
Contemporary conversations on international affairs and geo-politics highlight the positions being 
staked internationally by the world’s largest economies (Biden, 2020; Goldstein, 2020). As nation’s 
fight for positions of prominence on the world stage, competition spills over into technological space 
where nations and firms alike compete for leadership (Segal, 2020). 
 
Within this competitive space, there are multiple national models including one that can be identified 
as state capitalism, as we define below. We argue that within this sphere of nation and firm 
competitive convergence, but heightened inter-state divergence, the pandemic has been acting as a 
propellant. National ideologies about the nature of competition and the appropriate level of interaction 
between the state and private enterprise are emerging as a more vibrant area of debate because of the 
pandemic. 
In this section, we extend these ideas and depict current phenomena to illustrate how a deep dive into 
phenomena can be a catalyst to research on the pandemic. We do this by casting a conception of a 
world where we define the emergence of a phenomenon we call techno-nationalism.1 Techno-
nationalism refers to the mercantilist-like behavior that links technological innovation and private 
enterprise together. The goals of techno-nationalism extend beyond those typically associated with 
private enterprise, including national security, economic prosperity, and social stability. 
The outcomes and implications of techno-nationalism are only recently being realized, as the 
shockwaves from this new style of international competition by Chinese competitors are experienced 
by more and more firms. The reality is that global businesses have been shocked at the rapid speed of 
ascent of China’s enterprises. The emergence of competitively strong, managerially sophisticated, and 
technologically progressive Chinese enterprises has taken China from its position of being a massive 
net recipient of FDI in the early 2000s to being a country with FDI outflows that exceeded inflows by 
2016 (UNCTAD, 2020). 
Any failure to recognize this emergent reality in global competition will also lead to a failure to 
rethink approaches to competition and innovation in response to the success of China’s enviable brand 
of state capitalism. Although this recognition was in-progress, the economic slowdown created by the 
pandemic and then the microscope under which China has been placed as global value chains began 
to fracture, hastened acceptance of these new competitive truths. 
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Haste continues to be required as global competitors and governments need to rethink whether a 
laissez-faire economic model can continue to have primacy in a world where a few winners can take 
all in global markets and where the scale of investment required to compete continues to escalate. 
A few select numbers and quotes illustrate these points well. From 2013–2019, Google saw its R&D 
spending increase nearly fourfold from USD 7 billion in 2013 to USD 26 billion in 2019 (Statista, 
2020). The near impossibility of a single firm being able to engage in such massive R&D 
expenditures continuously was reflected in a comment by Eric Schmidt (Schmidt, 2020), Executive 
Chairman of Alphabet, who wrote, “Silicon Valley leaders have put too much faith in the private 
sector…the government needs to get back in the game in a serious way.” 
Schmidt is not alone in his views. Leaders in Microsoft, Facebook and Apple have similarly 
compelled the US Government to be more active in R&D. This call aligns with data from Capri 
(2020), who showed that the near 50/50 split that existed between US federal government spending 
and private sector spending on R&D in the mid-1950s, became 70 % by private firms and 20 % by the 
Federal government by 2018. 
As China’s aggregate annual R&D spending approaches that of the US, public expenditures on R&D 
in China continue to grow by about 18 % per year, while public expenditures in the US show a 
downturn. Further, China’s innovation mercantilism is marked by very large scale projects such as 
Made in China 2025, the China Standards 2035, the US$1.4 trillion Digital Belt and Road Initiative 
and the Thousand Talents Program. This new era of competition creates a race for national leadership 
in AI, Quantum Computing, Robotics, Energy Storage, New Energy Vehicles, and Semiconductors. 
Critically, as the funding challenge for R&D and innovation moves back into public sector space, 
there is a deliberate need for national-level strategic innovation systems to emerge. These changes 
will be marked by public-private partnerships, as governments become a closer partner in the 
innovation process. The public-private partnership model can be an alternative to China’s centralized 
model of techno-nationalism. 
The consequence for multinational firms is that they become unwitting players in this rise of techno-
nationalism. Multinational firms have historically been considered to be the drivers and distributors of 
innovation in world markets. Yet, with the rise of public-private partnerships, the private good 
outcome of research can become a public good, as governments lead a scale of innovation that an 
individual firm cannot. What will such a change mean for traditional theories of international 
business, as a key firm-specific asset of a multinational firm potentially becomes a public good 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976; Caves, 1982; Dunning, 1988). 
Moreover, as we move into the realm of stakeholder management and the growth of firms, it is clear 
that China’s newly emergent multinational firms have been put on their back foot as governments in 
multiple markets direct sanctions and other actions against Chinese multinational firms in a form of 
negative reciprocity. This negative reciprocity is a reaction to the perceived mercantilist practices that 
run counter to the fair and free trade rules meant to guide global competition. 
At the same time, firms will have to amplify efforts to manage their relationships with foreign 
governments to ensure they are not perceived to be hostile actors. In their home market, firms could 
become favored partners to the government, creating opportunities for favorable funding or other 
resource supplementation activities that eventually aid these firms in competition in other markets. 
Heightened strength and support can further distort markets and stifle open, vibrant international 
competition. Hence, multinational firms in the post-pandemic world must develop their stakeholder 





4.1. Global Value Chains 
Global value chains (GVCs) exemplify how the pandemic has accelerated changes in the structure of 
global competition. Since 2018, trade disputes have led multinational firms to decouple from China, 
in a process that has been called a China+1 strategy. The pandemic further revealed with little doubt 
the structural differences between the US and China. With China’s economy accounting for 20 % of 
global GDP, the acuity brought to these issues by the pandemic has turned a chase into a race. 
The consequence for GVCs in competition characterized by techno-nationalism and embedded in a 
world suffering a pandemic is that a new set of outcomes will emerge as policymakers and business 
leaders finally understand how profound is the commercial challenge presented by emerging 
multinationals from China. 
The most obvious response, and the one stated earlier, is that GVCs will continue to decouple, 
restructure, and have increased diversity in the countries that host the various parts of the GVCs 
(McWilliam, Kim, Mudambi, & Nielsen, 2020). Re-shoring, ring-fencing, and strategic localization 
will continue. This means, for example, that MNCs will devise an “In-China-for-China” or an “In-
America-for-America” supply ecosystem even if it results in redundancies and higher costs 
throughout GVCs in general. 
Multinational firms will make difficult choices about whether to re-locate back to the home country or 
move to alternative countries like Vietnam, India, Indonesia or Mexico. The desire to relocate to the 
home country will increase as the location-specific advantages of the home country are heightened as 
the US, the EU, and other political actors gradually implement their own techno-nationalistic 
schemes. 
As for managers within multinational firms, they will have to adopt business models that deal more 
strategically with competition in China, instead of approaching the market opportunistically and with 
a circumspect evaluation of the competitive risks. Managing GVCs, where resilience begins to battle 
for efficiency and effectiveness as the dominant objective, will become a more complex task. The era 
of GVC dispersion and fine-slicing is over, which creates boundless opportunities for scholars to 
reconfigure our understanding of international business. 
 
4.2. Semiconductors 
One of the industrial battlegrounds that will see these issues of techno-nationalism come to the 
forefront is semi-conductors. In the late 2010s, global sales of semiconductor technology approached 
half a trillion USD. China was the largest importer, with imports of semiconductor products 
exceeding that of imports of oil. The importance of semiconductors connects to the crucial role they 
play in the industries of the future: AI, data analytics, robotics and surveillance technology. 
Given this set of facts, it is not surprising that China has embarked on an ambitious strategy to fund 
growth in critical technologies with the government committing $300 billion over a ten-year period to 
the Made in China plan. Beyond this plan is funding assistance provided to technology funds, such as 
Tsinghua Holdings, which has been tasked with aiding the development of China’s semiconductor 
industry. 
Meanwhile, in a true techno-nationalistic effort, the US has responded by heightening non-tariff 
measures such as sanctions, export controls, contesting and blocking M&As, and creating more strict 
licensing requirements. Hence, as concerns the aforementioned prospects for research on the new 
pandemic-shaped landscape of international business, the semiconductor industry will be a living lab 
for those seeking to understand techno-nationalism, the new mercantilist world and the resultant 





Our final piece in this puzzle is the concept of techno-diplomacy, which has been manifest most 
prominently in the Huawei battle between the US and China. Techno-diplomacy is the process by 
which a techno-nationalist agenda is advanced. Partnerships, concessions, enticements and other 
typical tools of a foreign policy agenda play out in international forums, across institutions and on 
social media platforms and other types of digital media. 
Why techno-diplomacy is important to international business scholars is that it connects to several 
themes prominent in IB research. For example, techno-diplomacy is central to debates about digital 
democracy versus techno-authoritarianism, which in turn connects to issues related to coupling and 
decoupling, and fragmentation and realignment in the global economy. Public opinion and policy 
agendas supporting or combating globalization versus nationalism will be affected by techno-
diplomacy. 
Techno-diplomacy likewise influences the pursuit of international technology partnerships and 
alliances, both of which are core international business activities (Dunning, 1993). As the magnitude 
of the task of defining the scopes of AI ethics, cybersecurity, and R&D and innovation increase, we 
will see more public-private partnerships and cross-national collaborations, which was the raison 
d'être of IB research in the 1990s. 
Importantly and as connected to Hitt et al. (2020), the rise of techno-diplomacy will have to be 
matched by a redefinition of the rules frameworks for international trade and exchange as well as the 
multilateral institutions that govern such relationships. These changes can invigorate an already 
vibrant area of research on institutions; but in real-time, we can observe and analyze changes as they 
happen in the mandates and legitimacy of old multilateral organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and new ones such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The nature of global competition has changed and is continuing to change. There is little question that 
with the intensification of tensions between the US and China, amidst other burgeoning trade 
disputes, that the COVID-19 pandemic has placed new stresses on the foundations of international 
relationships. With greater stress, with more aggressive rhetoric on the international stage, and with 
the emergence of variable models to business and government cooperation in major economies in the 
world, the pressures that the pandemic creates have the potential to substantially, and potentially 
dangerously, deepen the fractures that have appeared. Importantly, recall how the Great Depression 
led to nationalistic and isolationist pressures that culminated in World War II. 
Yet, even though we believe that the fractures between nations are both magnifying and deepening 
because of heightened tensions, we also believe that people and organizations can act as cohesive 
forces that limit the extent to which globalization forces are slowed or repelled. As such, we 
encourage scholars to focus on understanding how individuals are affected by the pandemic in terms 
of their inclinations towards globalization. We further suggested that scholars should also look to see 
how organizations are reacting and to explore how their structures and strategy influence these 
reactions. These two sets of arguments emerged from our view that scholars can contribute to research 
by either the traditional means of designing studies as principally informed by prior literature, or by 
focusing on leveraging methodologies that can provide unique and deep conceptual insights into 
organizations and their processes. 
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Fundamentally, we believe strongly that scholars must develop an understanding of the ‘why’ of how 
people and organizations are reacting to this transformed international environment. People are part of 
the grand unknown in this transformation. Cross-border flows of people who travel for work, study, 
leisure and other reasons have been impeded. More worrisome is that people new to a country and 
citizens of the host country both have become less open, less understanding and less tolerant. When 
this happens, it not only creates social strains in a heightening of an us-versus-them mentality, it also 
leads to reductions in the inter-cultural, social support system needed for the conduct of international 
business. 
For organizations, we have some evidence that structures, systems, and processes in multinational 
firms can either compel managers to succumb to pressures to retract from international markets and 
reconfigure GVCs, or that structures, systems, and processes in a firm can provide cohesion by 
emboldening managers to take advantages of the changed world that exists around them. Put in more 
research-friendly terms; we can seek to understand more fully how heterogeneity in multinational firm 
strategy and structure influences varied sets of responses to the challenges and opportunities that are 
emerging in the pandemic. 
Yet, we can only gain this understanding through the implementation of methodologies appropriate to 
the context. The COVID-19 pandemic creates this opportunity because it provides an external context 
in which intellectually curious and emboldened scholars can understand in real-time the formative 
processes to the key decisions and strategies that multinational firms are adopting in response to 
newly-forming pressures (Delios, 2017). More so than documenting what has happened, we can 
understand why it has happened – which is a much more gripping story to write. 
At the same time, there is an opportunity to recast our theories of multinational enterprise based on 
the emergence of techno-nationalism. We detailed this world of techno-nationalism as a 
phenomenological based motivation for exploring the implications of the pandemic on the world of 
international business. We encourage scholars to address the question: “If the state becomes more 
influential in fostering the technological prowess of domestic companies, if the state continues to 
organize competition with a visible hand, and if the world returns to competition predicated on 
mercantilist philosophies, what does it mean for theories of multinational enterprise founded on 
notions of the independence of the state and commerce, and the independent generation of firm-
specific advantages?” Already, we have had challenges to the conceptual underlays of the 
international expansion process through the global emergence of firms from East and South East Asia 
(Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002); we now have a new lab blossoming on a global scale, in which we can 
reimagine what are the precursors to international expansion and what are the foundations to long 
term success in international markets. 
At the end of the day, these opportunities will only be realized if the research community embraces 
the pandemic-generated uncertainty to leverage it via pathbreaking investigations into newly-
emergent phenomena, using methods that speak to the real-time accumulation of data that also 
connect to processes and structures that drive decisions and outcomes. This statement in itself carries 
no new information, but what it does do is alert us to the tremendous possibilities that exist to broaden 
our understanding of international business and multinational firms, as created by the accelerant 
nature of the COVID-19 pandemic in the globalizing world in which we are all embedded. 
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